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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past ten years, associates of the Center for Political Econ-
omy and Natural Resources at Montana State University have system-
atically analyzed governmental management of natural resources on
the public lands. Working with federal agencies, such as the United
States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), pri-
vate foundations, and economists and policy analysts, the Center has
carefully examined the federal government's management of timber,
grazing, minerals, energy resources, wildlife, and recreation. The
Center was one of the first organizations to speak out against the profli-
gate use and nonuse of these resources and to arrive at viable manage-
ment alternatives-alternatives that are both economically and
environmentally sound.' One concern was the growing discontent in
the West that blossomed and grew into the Sagebrush Rebellion. Al-
though the Rebellion no longer has the emotional or local political sup-
* John Baden is Director of the Center for Political Economy and Natural Resources
at Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana. He has also been a contract logger in the
northwest and currently operates a family sheep ranch in the Gallitan Valley near Bozeman.
** Richard Stroup is Director of the Office of Policy Analysis in the U.S. Department
of Interior, on leave as co-director of the Center. He is also co-author of the widely used
textbook, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE. Together, Baden and Stroup have
written extensively, their latest efforts being BUREAUCRACY Vs. ENVIRONMENT: THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL COSTS Orf BUREAUCRATC GOVERNANCE (1981), and NATURAL RESOURCES:
MYTHS AND MANAGEMENT (forthcoming: Ballinger Press).
1. See ag., J. BADEN & R. STROUP, BUREAUCRACY Vs. ENVIRONMENT: THE ENVi-
RONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE (1981); J. Baden & R. Stroup, Prop-
eryRights and NaturalResource Management, LITERATURE OF LIBERTY, Oct.-Dec. 1979, at
5; J. Baden & R. Stroup, Private Rights, Public Choices, and the Management of National
Forests, WESTERN WILDLANDS, Aut. 1975, at 5; J. Baden & R. Stroup, Externality, Property
Rights andthe Management of Our NationalForests, J.L. & ECON. (Apr. 1974); R. STROUP &
J. BADEN, Propery Rights, Environmental Quali, and the Management of National Forests,
MANAGING THE COMMONS (1977).
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port that it did a year or so ago, the conditions that prompted its
genesis are still with us and solutions are still required.
To ask if one supports the Sagebrush Rebellion is roughly analo-
gous to asking if one supports changes in the American health care
system. The answer, of course, depends on the consequences of the
changes advocated. In supporting reforms of the United States health
care system, one would not necessarily advocate voodoo health care,
faith healing, snake handling, or socialized medicine. In much the
same way, one must consider the likely outcomes of the changes advo-
cated by the Sagebrush rebels. While the reforms most commonly ad-
vanced by supporters of the Rebellion will not guarantee increased
efficiency, improved environmental quality, or increased equity, re-
forms that take the Rebellion's arguments one step further are decid-
edly more promising, especially those that are feared the most, such as
privatization.
The Sagebrush Rebellion had its roots in Nevada, where the fed-
eral government owns and manages 87 percent of the land. In July
1979, an angry state legislature passed a law giving the state control of
49 million acres of federal land, the federal government refused to re-
linquish control, and the Sagebrush Rebellion was born. Since then,
other Western states have considered similar legislation, encouraged
and supported by those who felt a growing frustration with federal bu-
reaucratic regulations and restrictions.2
Recently, however, supporters of the Rebellion have backed away
from the fight, content to let the conservatives in Congress and the
White House work their will. Many believe that with Ronald Reagan
in the White House (before the election, an open supporter of the Re-
bellion) and James Watt in the Department of Interior, the Sagebrush
Rebellion should dissemble. They contend that the movement is no
longer needed to lobby for change. Those who support such a conclu-
sion are seriously mistaken.
The Sagebrush Rebellion developed because of a generalized dis-
enchantment with the management of federally owned and managed
resources. Economic and environmental abuses generated by federal
agencies are common throughout the West, and they affect a great
many people, including ranchers, farmers, loggers, and recreationists.
The Forest Service practice of chaining and clearcutting large areas of
the national forests is an alarmingly vivid example. Others include Bu-
reau of Reclamation water projects, deficit timber sales, many silvicul-
tural and road-building activities, relatively arcane and technical
2. See The Angry West vs. the Rest, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1979, at 31; The Rebel
Slows, Great Falls Tribune, Nov. 2, 1979, at 14; Rebellion or Greed?, Los Angeles Times,
Sept. 10, 1979, pt. II, at 6; Decolonizing the West, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 22.
[Vol. 3
POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVES
schemes such as rest-rotation grazing and the allowable cut effect, and
the nondeclining even-flow constraint on federal timber management.
3
Unfortunately, the fundamental, structural characteristics that pre-
cipitated current problems have been either incorrectly diagnosed or
ignored. Until these institutional proclivities are addressed and re-
formed, the basic causes of the Sagebrush Rebellion will continue to
generate conflict, although probably with a different constituency.
Some have confidently claimed that the conditions that prompted
the Sagebrush Rebellion were generated by bad people. Now that the
good guys are in charge, we are told, the problems will soon be re-
solved or at least substantially ameliorated. This attitude is a danger-
ous example of political naivete and economic ignorance. The
problems cannot be solved until institutions force decision makers to
face the true benefits and opportunity costs (that is, the best available
alternative foregone) of alternative actions and the comparative values
of alternative mixes of joint products. There must also be incentives to
act on this information.
We will temporarily digress here to defend the personnel in the
Forest Service, the BLM, and other agencies charged with managing
natural resources. Although our impressions are based on casual em-
piricism, they are well founded. It has been our experience that the
most promising graduates of natural resource programs tend to pursue
graduate work or to find employment with the Forest Service or the
BLM. While political appointees may be of a different stripe, those on
the ground are likely to be both competent and well intended. The
problem, therefore, is not one of bad people, but one of institutional
design.
II. CONSTITUENCY OF THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION
Although American citizens have been blessed with an especially
benign political environment, many of them are beginning to under-
stand that government is the most efficient engine ever designed for the
generation of plunder. Among the most vocal groups currently con-
demning governmental management and control is the Libertarian
Party. The Libertarians have a growing political base that is increas-
ingly placing their people on national and local ballots.4 Their belief in
the private rights of all citizens (excluding that governmental interven-
3. For a more detailed discussion of these practices, see BADEN & STROUP, BUREAU-
CRACY Vs. ENviRoNmENT, supra note 1.
4. U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., BUREAU OF STAT., STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS 498 (101st ed.
1980). For example, in 1976, Roger McBride, presidential candidate for the Libertarian
Party received only 173,011 votes. Ed Clark, the 1980 Libertarian presidential candidate
received 876,557 votes.
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tion necessary to insure physical safety and the protection of those
rights) goes a step beyond the states' rights advocated by the Sagebrush
rebels, but the movement was spawned by the same high incidence of
governmental mismanagement.5 Bipartisan groups have also gained
support. The National Taxpayers' Union, for example, has helped to
persuade at least 27 state legislatures that a balanced budget and a con-
stitutional convention are necessary for the public good.6
When the government provides a context of law and order and an
institutional infrastructure that enables individuals to concentrate on
cooperative and productive rather than on either offensive or defensive
transfer activities, the net social product can be dramatically enhanced.
Anderson and Hill, in BIRTH OF A TRANSFER SOCIETY, define transfer
activities as those that "add to the wealth of specific individuals or
groups of individuals but reduce the wealth of other individuals or
groups in the society."7 Fortunately, there are entrepreneurs, some-
times called speculators, in the private arena who benefit society-and
themselves-by systematically moving resources to more highly valued
uses, providing a source of growth, prosperity, and enhanced social
welfare. Unfortunately, entrepreneurs also operate in the government
sector.
The United States Constitution has given us the best recipe ever
written for improving social welfare. Over the past century, beginning
with Munn v. Illinois in 1876,8 political entrepreneurs (that is, bureau-
cratic managers and decision makers) have moved us from a society
where "getting ahead" required productivity to a different one where
some of the best investments lie in transferring wealth from one group,
without their consent, to another or in defending oneself against such
attempts. The government apparatus is used freely to support this
transfer society. Anderson and Hill put it this way: "[p]roductive ac-
tivity is a positive-sum game, or social interaction, that enlarges the pie.
Transfer activity, on the other hand, is a negative-sum game-a series
of social interactions that decreases the size of the pie. There is less
after the social interaction than before." 9
Lester Thurow, the MIT economist most noted for THE ZERO SUM
5. Libertarian Party, 1980 Platform (adopted in convention, Los Angeles, Cal., Sept.
6-9, 1979).
6. Shades ofthe Founding Fathers: The Drive/or a New Constitutional Convention, 113
TIME, Feb. 17, 1979, at 18.
7. T. ANDERSON & P. HILL, THE BIRTH OF A TRANSFER SOCIETY 3 (1980).
8. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), stood for the proposition that "under the pow-
ers inherent in the sovereignty, a government may regulate the conduct of its citizens toward
each other, and when necessary for the public good, the manner in which each shall use his
own property."
9. T. ANDERSON & P. HILL, supra note 7, at 3.
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SocmTy, tells us that "a zero-sum game is any game where the losses
exactly equal the winnings,"'" and that we are now living in a zero-
sum, or no-growth, society. Further, "where at least some of our ener-
gies were previously used to enlarge the economic pie, all of our ener-
gies can now be devoted to dividing a pie that has stopped growing."
What Thurow fails to recognize is that allocations made by the political
sector are negative-sum rather than zero-sum. When the government
allocates resources, special interests invest their resources in efforts to
change the rules of the political game in their favor or to defend against
such changes. Rather than being productive, these activities control
production and contribute to the wasteful use of limited resources. The
Sagebrush Rebellion is best understood in this context.
The supporters of the Sagebrush Rebellion believe that their share
of the allocations of resources would be enhanced if the management
and control of federal lands were transferred to state jurisdiction. They
are probably correct. Bureaucrats in the state capital are likely to be
more accessible and responsive to local interests and lobbyists than
those who operate out of the remote labyrinth of local, regional, or
national BLM offices. Depending on the probabilities of success, in-
vestments made in promoting the Sagebrush Rebellion may have been
rational in terms of first order consequences and almost surely in terms
of second order consequences.
When decisions are made in the political arena, however, pro-
tracted and vitriolic conflict can be expected. The long, drawn out fight
over the Tellico Dam and the supposed extinction of the snail darter,
for example, was extraordinarily costly for all parties involved. 2 Both
sides were convinced of the rightness of their position and yielding
ground was out of the question, so enormous resources were devoted to
oppose or defend the building of the dam. When politicians and bu-
reaucrats control the public lands, any proposed use can become a bat-
tleground for a clash of special interests.
The active supporters of the Sagebrush Rebellion have been
predominantly cattlemen and sheepmen, oil and other energy opera-
10. L. Tnunow, THn ZERO SUM SOCIETY 11 (1980).
11. Id. at 117.
12. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn 1976). Environ-
mental groups and other parties brought an action under the Endangered Species Act of
1973 to enjoin the Tennessee Valley Authority [hereinafter cited as TVA] from completing a
dam and impounding a section of the Little Tennessee River. The U.S. Court of Appeals,
(6th Cir.) on appeal reversed the lower court and granted injunctive relief even though
eighty percent of the project was completed and over ninety million dollars had been ex-
pended. The court found that TVA had failed to comply with the provisions of the Endan-
gered Species Act by not addressing the impact on the tiny snail darter, an endangered
species. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977). On appeal from
that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the injunction. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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tors, miners, and representatives of several other commodity groups.
For example, those attending the 1980 meetings of the League for the
Advancement of States' Equal Rights (a forum for supporters of the
Sagebrush Rebellion) included representatives of the National In-
holders Association, the California Coastal Council, Safari Club Inter-
national, the International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies,
Chevron Oil, the National Cattlemen's Association, and the American
Institute of Professional Geologists. 3 Notably absent from the Rebel-
lion's ranks have been representatives of the forest products industry,
perhaps because of the peculiarities of federal timber management and
the implicit subsidies obtained by these firms under the constraints of
even-flow nondeclining yield and the allowable cut effect. 4
There has also been a decided lack of environmentalist support for
the Sagebrush Rebellion, which is initially quite puzzling. It is, after
all, obvious that despite reasonable intentions bureaucratic entrepre-
neurs in the Forest Service, the BLM, the Bureau of Reclamation, the
Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs have con-
sistently and systematically used the federal treasury to subsidize the
destruction of environmental quality. Examples of such abuse are
legion.
The Forest Service, which controls 187 million acres of public
land, was established in 1905 to bring scientific, businesslike manage-
ment to United States forests. It has employed science, but it has
shown little regard for economy or efficiency as it has gone about mis-
managing vast tracts of forest and wilderness. For example, the Forest
Service has terraced significant portions of our national forests,
planned recreational developments in wilderness areas, and arranged
deficit timber sales. As Hyde states in LAND ALLOCATION AND Eco-
NOMIC EFFICIENCY, ". . . multiple use requirements, restrictions on
clearcutting. . . , and high logging road standards all increase harvest
costs on the. . . public lands. . . .Together these factors have made
forest management, particularly forest management on public lands,
one of the more controversial areas in all resource and environmental
management."' 5 In general, the Forest Service has roaded and logged
forests that are defacto wilderness areas, using methods that would fail
the cost versus revenue calculations of Weyerhauser or Boise
13. LASER, AGENDA FOR THE '80s: A NEW FEDERAL LAND POLICY (Proceedings of
the National Conference on States Rights, the Sagebrush Rebellion, and Federal Land Pol-
icy, Salt Lake City, Utah, Nov. 20-24, 1980).
14. See B. Dowdle, An Institutional Dinosaur with an Ace.- Or, How to Piddle Away
Public Timber Wealth and Foul the Environment in the Process, J. BADEN & R. STROUP,
BUREAUCRACY Vs. ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 170-85.
15. W.F. HYDE, TIMBER SUPPLY, LAND ALLOCATION, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 2
(1980).
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Cascade. 16
The BLM's record is no less discouraging. The agency has
chained and has scheduled for chaining millions of acres of pinyon-
juniper ecosystems in the "Elfin Forests" of the southwest. 7 It has also
designed controversial rest-rotation programs for use on 87 percent of
its grazing areas." The Bureau of Reclamation has destroyed winter
range by building the Teton Dam and other projects that can be justi-
fied only at two or three or four percent interest rates, while ignoring
the negative externalities-those costs that accrue to parties other than
the decision maker-imposed by these projects.' 9 The Bureau of In-
dian Affairs has outlawed the traditional checks on overgrazing, foster-
ing the development of the worst range conditions ever experienced in
the United States and impoverishing Indians in the name of communal
ownership." At the same time, the Army Corps of Engineers has at-
tempted to justify the expansion of its activities by referring to an en-
ergy crisis that was generated primarily by governmental policies.2'
Environmentalists, fiscal conservatives, and individuals who value
liberty agree that the current system consistently displays poor judg-
ment when these programs are supported. Yet, to date, the Sagebrush
Rebellion has failed to unite these groups. A failure to understand and
conceptualize the real source of the problem has caused many to label
the Sagebrush Rebellion the "Sagebrush Ripoff." The charge is not
without merit.
While marginal improvement could be made by transferring fed-
eral lands to the states, there are a few apriori reasons to expect any
significant improvements just because control is transferred from one
bureaucracy to another. In terms of environmental quality, equity, effi-
ciency, and enhanced cooperation, a workable solution to the problem
lies in a reliance on private property rights and the rule of willing con-
sent. Only when land users face the true costs and benefits of their
actions will productivity and environmental concern prevail. And only
then can individuals be allowed to do as they wish. In other words,
16. See B. Dowdle, supra note 14, and M. Clawson, The NationalForests, 191 SCIENCE
1976, at 762-67.
17. R.M. Lanner, Chained to the Bottom, in J. BADEN & R. STROUP, BuREAucRAcY
Vs. ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 154-69.
18. See Sabine Kremp, -4 Perspective on BLM Grazing Policy, in J. BADEN & R.
STRoup, BUREAUCRACY Vs. ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 124-53.
19. See B. Shanks, Dams and Disasters: The Social Problems of Water Development
Policies, in J. BADEN & R. STROUP, BUREAUCRACY Vs. ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 108-
23.
20. See G.D. Libecap & R.N. Johnson, The Navajo and Too Many Sheep, in J. BADEN
& R. STRoup, BUREAUCRACY Vs. ENVIRoNMENT, supra note 1, at 87-107.
21. See Shanks, supra note 19.
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accountability is a prerequisite to productive behavior, environmental
sensitivity, and individual freedom.
In the private sector, the asset value of the land is the voice of the
future. It holds the owner's wealth hostage to good management. Any
erosion of productive land, any scarring of scenic land, or any destruc-
tion of unique habitat valued by scientists or clubs (for example, the
Audubon Society and The Nature Conservancy) will hurt society over
the long run. Such irresponsible behavior also hurts the owner's wealth
by lowering the land's asset value. Land values-that is, the present
capitalized value of all future services from the land-hold the owner
accountable.22
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIETY
Resources have been scarce since the Garden of Eden. Some
things of value-that is, some combination of time, effort, and
money-must be given up to obtain scarce resources. Such things have
an economic value. Thus, to assert that something has an economic
value is merely to claim that people are willing to trade off other things
of value to obtain them. It is important to understand that economic
values include more than goods that carry a price tag. 3
Given that some resources are scarce in all societies, the first prob-
lem of social organization is how to use the available mix of resources
to yield the highest assortment of ends. As Hayek states in INDIVIDU-
ALISM AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER, "It is rather a problem of how to
secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of soci-
ety, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know."2 4
We can see that the fundamental problem of forest management is
one of planning. To produce the social optimum, the planners must
know (1) how badly people want each product, (2) how to most effi-
ciently produce each product, and (3) how to motivate people to effi-
ciently produce each product. Unless answers to these questions are
known and implemented, optimal production will occur only by acci-
dent-and it is probably safe to assume that such accidents are exceed-
ingly rare.
The important question is simply stated: By what method may
answers to these questions best be generated in a constantly changing
environment? Both preferences and opportunities are in continual flux.
Given that it is exceedingly difficult for a large bureaucracy to be time
22. T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE & DECISIONS 122-26 (1980).
23. A.A. ALCHIAN & W.R. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS: ELEMENTS OF INQUIRY
Ch. 4 (3d ed. 1972).
24. F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 78 (1972).
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and place specific, we can begin to appreciate the problems that even
the most competent public land managers must confront.
It is obvious that some form of decentralization is required if pro-
duction is to be optimized. The Forest Service is divided into nine re-
gions and subdivided into 125 national forests, and each forest is
further divided into ranger districts.25 This arrangement, however, is
not good enough. To be responsive to changing demands and opportu-
nities (e.g., the demand for lumber is down while that for hiking trails
is up), the decision maker must know the relative changes in prefer-
ences and opportunities.
When all items carry a price that correctly states their opportunity
costs, individuals in a market system based on property rights and will-
ing exchange will systematically move resources to their most highly
valued uses. In a market, data automatically come to decision makers
in the form of bid and asked prices, and the sincerity of the bidder
never needs to be questioned. No such mechanism is available without
the use of pricing and private, transferable rights. As Hyde states,
"Only public agencies, such as the Forest Service, can ignore prices and
at the same time isolate themselves from questions of market entry or
exit. Even... private landowners who apply some [Forest Service
practice]... must be price responsive. Their continued existence de-
pends on a degree of price competitiveness. 26
When the relevant facts are distributed among many people, prices
foster the coordination of a vast number of people. For example, as-
sume that tomorrow a new use is found for Port Orford cedar, a tree
used to produce wooden pencils. A Druid religious sect has received a
revelation instructing its believers to construct temples of Port Orford
cedar all over the world. With an increase in demand and a set supply,
the price will increase. Current users need not know about Druids, or
even that they exist, but merely that the relative price of cedar has
increased.
This shift in relative prices provides the information that the wood
is more scarce. It also provides incentives to economize on the use of
25. Information Office, United States Forest Service Headquarters, Bozeman, Mon-
tana. Seelso U.S.F.S., AN ASSEsSMENT OF THE FOREST AND RANGE LAND SITUATION
IN THE UMrrED STATEs x-xiv (1980). In 1977, 1.7 billion acres, about 71 percent of the
nation's area, was classified as forest and range land and water. About 820 million acres of
that mass is rangeland. Another 737 million acres is classified as forest land of which about
482 million acres is commercial timberland. The remaining 107 million acres is water, pri-
marily lakes, reservoirs, ponds, streams and estuaries. The bulk, about 53 percent, of these
forest and rangelands is privately owned. Nevertheless, the federal and state governments
own and control vast areas of highly valued resource land. The majority of the 286 million
acres of publicly owned forest land, mostly federal, is concentrated in the western states. It
is management of these lands which has stirred so much controversy in recent years.
26. HYDE, supra note 15, at 29.
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cedar and to intensify the search for substitutes. Some users may know
all the facts, others may believe that students have started smoking
cedar shavings due to its aphrodisiac properties, while others may be-
lieve that Mount St. Helens buried the forest under 100 feet of ash.
From the users' perspective, however, the cause of increased scarcity is
irrelevant. Prices minimize the amount of information required for in-
telligent decision making.
In marked contrast, centralized bureaucracies maximize informa-
tion requirements. In terms of social welfare, it is important to under-
stand that the impact of the scarcity is diffused to everyone affected in
production and consumption. Producers of cedar substitutes will con-
front higher demands, as will the makers of mechanical pencils and
ballpoint pens. The market is such that this process of adjustment oc-
curs in the absence of centralized plans. Knowledge is automatically
produced and acted upon. Thus, the price system generates and dis-
perses relevant information that is voluntarily taken into account.
Thus far we have spoken of economic efficiency and the bureau-
cratic pathologies involved in the reduction of environmental quality.
The next question is how an institutional reformation may serve the
interests of the preservationists-environmentalists and at the same time
increase the efficiency of resource utilization and the sensitivity with
which resources are harvested or extracted.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS, SENSITIVITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
STEWARDSHIP
Environmentalists fought the Sagebrush Rebellion knowing that a
successful rebellion would conflict with their interests.27 They realized
that timber sheds are also amenity sheds, and uses are often uncompli-
mentary. Resource development and extraction are the problems; and
despite its record of environmental atrocities, federal management was
viewed as preferable to state control. This faith in existing institutions
was and is unfounded. America's dependence on foreign sources for
strategic minerals provides a good beginning for a discussion of how
private property rights could advantage the cause of wilderness advo-
cates and preservationists.
America is almost totally dependent on foreign sources for at least
a dozen essential minerals and for more than 50 percent of a half a
dozen other essential minerals.28 Over 90 percent of the columbite,
27. B. Cunningham, The Sagebrush Rebellion.- A Threat to Our Western Heritage (Ad-
dress to the Montana Cattlemen's Association Annual Meeting, Helena, Montana, January
29, 1981).
28. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 12, 1979, at 75. See also Background Pa-
pers: Draft for Public Review and Comment of the Report on Nonfuel Minerals Policy
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strontium, titanium, manganese, chromite, and cobalt are almost com-
pletely supplied by sources outside the United States. Further, most of
the sources of these minerals are politically unstable or potentially hos-
tile countries. Manganese, for example, comes mainly from the Soviet
Union and South Africa. Cobalt is imported primarily from Zaire,
where 65 percent of the noncommunist world reserve is located. The
major chromium deposits are in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the So-
viet Union. Given the limited short-run potentials for substitution, our
high technology society is extremely dependent on these strategic
minerals. 2
9
While this situation may delight those who revel in the fantasies of
ECOTOPIA3° and who find in Mother Earth News (a publication aimed
at back-to-nature advocates) their analogue to the Wall Street Journal,
Congress is unlikely to be so sympathetic. Representative James San-
tini (D.-Nev.), chairman of the House Committee on Mines and Miner-
als, believes that "a chrome embargo by the Soviet Union and
Zimbabwe would bring the entire industrial world to its knees in just
six months."'" William Dresher, Dean of the College of Mines at the
University of Arizona and former chairman of the National Academy
of Sciences Committee on Nonrenewable Resources, documents and
amplifies Santini's concerns.32 John P. Morgan Jr., chief staff officer of
the United Staes Bureau of Mines, states, "The U.S. could be virtually
self-sufficient in all but a few minerals, such as chromite."33 This view
is shared by Senator Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico, a geologist and
former astronaut, who says, "Nature endowed us with unbelievably
vast resources, most of which have not been tapped."
34
A relatively high percentage of the land in mineral-rich states is in
the public domain; 95 percent in Alaska, 86 percent in Nevada, 66 per-
cent in Utah, and 64 percent in Idaho.35 In 1977, the Department of
Interior reported that 42 percent of the public lands was closed to hard
rock mineral activity, 16 percent was severely restricted, and another 10
Review (Wash. D.C.: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Aug. 1979); COMPTROLLER GENERAL RE-
PORT To CONGRESS, THE U.S. MINING AND MINERAL-PROCEsSING INDUSTRY: AN ANAL-
Ysis OF TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS (G.A.O. 1979), and MILLER, FINE & McMicHAEL,
THE RESOURCE WAR IN 3-D: DEPENDENCY, DIPLOMACY, DEFENSE (1980).
29. Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1979, at 24.
30. E. CALLENBACH, EcToPIA (1975).
31. Rep. James Santini, quoted by T. Velocci, Minerals: The Resource Gap, 68 NA-
TION'S BUSINESS 36 (Oct. 1980).
32. Id. at 34; W. DRESHER, RAW MATERIALS FOR INDUSTRY: OUR NExT MAJOR CRI-
sIs 5 (1979).
33. J.P. Morgan, quoted by Vellocci, supra note 31, at 36.
34. Sen. Harrison Schmitt, quote by Velocci, supra note 31, at 36.
35. PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEw COMMISSION, ONE-THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND
121-38 (1970).
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percent was moderately restricted.36 One of the major problems with
this trend, as seen by J. Allen Overton, president of the American Min-
ing Congress, is that "the overwhelming part of these lands was never
adequately evaluated for mineral potential.
37
In the case of wilderness designation, there could be significant
opportunity costs involved. When minerals are not extracted from pro-
tected lands, society pays the price in goods that are not produced and
in higher prices for goods that are produced. Wilderness designation is
a transfer activity that is similar to any other governmental program
involving a redistribution of wealth. In this case, society pays the op-
portunity costs so that the individuals who enjoy the wilderness can
reap the benefits.
Environmentalists, preservationists, and wilderness buffs see the
Sagebrush Rebellion as a threat rather than as an opportunity. The
danger for wilderness advocates is that national policy could change
drastically in the face of politically induced constraints on the supply of
strategic minerals. Senator Schmitt, aware of these ecologic and eco-
nomic concerns, has suggested the possibility of basic changes being
made in national land policy. He says, "As Soviet and other forces in
the world gradually restrict or control our access to world energy and
mineral resources, the question that wilderness advocates must answer
is: Will they then advocate reopening Alaska and other federally con-
trolled lands for rapid exploration and development in the national in-
terest, when the national interest so dictates?"3
Those who remember the oil shortage that began in November
1973 realize that environmental concerns can be quickly swept away
when the United States runs low on vital resources. Even with the cur-
rent abundance of oil on the market, there is still pressure to open some
wilderness areas to exploration. The political railroading of the Alas-
kan pipeline in a frantic, but uneconomical and environmentally haz-
ardous effort to move oil to the Midwest is still a troubling memory for
many. Ideally, the economic costs of any ecologically motivated action
would be taken into account, but the ecological cost of any economi-
cally motivated action should also be entered into our calculus. The
best hope of fulfilling both of these objectives lies precisely in the insti-
tution of private property rights.
The National Audubon Society is concerned with environmental
quality in general and wildlife habitat in particular.39 In addition to a
36. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 28.
37. J. Overton, quoted by Velocci, supra note 31.
38. Supra note 34.
39. For more on this see J. Baden & R. Stroup, Saving the Wilderness: A Radical Pro-
posal, 13 REASON 28-36 (July 1981).
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substantial educational and publishing operation, the Society also owns
75 wildlife sanctuaries.' The Paul J. Rainey Wildlife Sanctuary in
Vermilion Parish, Louisiana, is a 26,000-acre bird refuge that is so sen-
sitive that tourists are unwelcome. Even unmonitored bird watchers
are forbidden entry. The refuge is carefully controlled and managed
for otter, mink, deer, reptiles, hundreds of thousands of birds-and oil
and natural gas wells.
Because the Rainey Preserve is in private hands, there is every in-
centive to use the resource efficiently. The timing, placement, opera-
tion, and structure of the oil operation is carefully programmed with
the seasonal habitat requirements of the wildlife residents. In the Au-
dubon Society's description of the Rainey Sanctuary, they make the
following statement: "There are oil wells in Rainey which are potential
sources of pollution. Yet Audubon's experience during the past few
decades indicated that oil can be extracted without measurable damage
to the marsh. Extra precautions to prevent pollution have proven
effective."'4 1
Revenue derived from the wells is used to buy additional preserves
and achieve Audubon Society goals. This is clearly a positive-sum
game. All participants win: the birds and wildlife have their habitat
preserved, the public gets its oil, and Audubon receives revenues to
purchase additional preserves. The outcome is a function of property
rights that lead to cooperative and efficient behavior.
Contrast Audubon's actions on their own lands with their pro-
nouncements against exploration on the public lands. The difference in
harmony between political and market decision making is extreme. In
a recent "Emergency Dispatch" to Audubon Society members, Presi-
dent Russell Peterson stated: "The National Audubon Society is enter-
ing a battle. A battle we must win. If we lose, we will witness the
irrevocable destruction of much of America's natural heritage."4 2 An-
*other memo to members complains: "Secretary [of Interior] Watt has
undertaken a program involving land exchanges and transfers to the
detriment of federal holdings, and has supported the divestiture or
transfer of federal responsibility over the nation's public lands-a pro-
gram which will ultimately lead to over-exploration by indiscriminate
private interests."'43
40. There are also approximately 100 refuges operated by local chapters of the Audu-
bon Society. See NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY, PAMPHLET, IsLANDS OF LIFE: THE NA-
TIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY SANCTUARIES; and NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY,
PHAMPHLET, 1981 FACT SHEET (1981).
41. Id., ISLANDS OF LIFE at 19.
42. R. Peterson, Emergency Dipatch (addressed to National Audubon Society
members).
43. Memo to R. Peterson from B. Butler, distributed to National Audubon Society
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE
We propose here, as we did to Representative Santini's Committee
on Mines and Mining, that wilderness lands be transferred in fee sim-
ple terms to environmental groups. Although such an action would
generate a tremendous windfall gain to groups not noted for their dis-
advantaged status, it may be a tolerable price to pay for the benefits
that would be generated. It is important to remember that the incen-
tives faced by the professional managers of these organizations as own-
ers and residual claimants are dramatically different than those faced
by the same individuals as political adversaries. 44
By its very nature, the mining of strategic minerals must be con-
centrated if it is to pay. Less than one million acres have been mined
for nonfuel minerals in the last fifty years in the United States, and 90
percent of the free world's mineral requirements are supplied by less
than 1,200 mines.45 A small area of wilderness land used for mineral
production might make a tremendous difference in terms of America's
mineral independence. It is clearly inefficient to lock up such areas
when a relatively insignificant portion of that land could yield huge
mineral wealth and possibly strengthen national security. When it is
reported that the federal government has withdrawn two-thirds of the
nation's land from mining entry,46 politically active representatives,
such as James Santini, become increasingly agitated.47
It is unlikely that many large mineral deposits would be located in
areas of critical environmental concern. Those lands that have a high
economic but a low ecological value should clearly be made available
for development. Conversely, those with a high ecological but a low
economic value should be left alone in a market setting. It would be
especially beneficial if areas with both ecological and economic impor-
tance were managed by groups with the expertise to weigh the potential
damage to the environment against the potential profits. The obvious
way to accomplish this is to make environmental groups the owners of
Members 2. See also NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT; NATIONAL
AUDUBON SOCIETY, PAMPHLET, A DOUBLE BILL: COMING SOON To YOUR PUBLIC LANDS;
and R. Peterson, No Mandate to Destroy Environmental Laws, Bozeman Daily Chronicle,
Aug. 13, 1981, at 4.
44. There is such a variety of distribution plans that might be used under such a system
that the subject cannot be properly addressed in this article, but see J. Baden, Diversity,
StabiY, and Adaptability in Economic and Ecological Systems (paper presented at confer-
ence on Politics vs. Policy: The Public Lands Dilemma, Utah State University, Logan,
Utah, Apr. 21-23, 1982).
45. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 28.
46. G. Bennethum & L. Courtland Lee, Is Our Account Overdrawn? MINING CONG. J.,
Sept. 1975, at 33.
47. Hearings on National Defense Stockpile, 1981, (Hearings before House of Rep.
Comm. on Armed Services, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981).
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the holdings; that is, residual claimants able to garner any benefits they
generate via added resource values. Under these conditions, it is likely
that other environmental interest groups would emulate the Audubon
Society on the Rainey Sanctuary.
Assume that wilderness and restricted land is transferred in fee
simple terms to an environmental interest group. The organization
would then have the opportunity to lease the mineral rights and obtain
the royalties. How would the organization behave? Given that the
managers and directors of the interest group are intelligent and dedi-
cated, they will attempt, in accord with their values, to maximize the
potential value of the resource. Assuming that they have a general in-
terest in wilderness values and are not oriented toward any specific
land area, they will carefully evaluate the contribution that this land
could make to their goals.
For example, if the area has a titanium deposit that is expected to
yield a million dollars worth of net benefits, they would consider devel-
oping it. They would confront three basic questions: First, how much
profit would such an activity yield? Second, how much additional wil-
derness land or services could be bought with that profit? Third, is
there a way to manage these lands that will permit mineral extraction
while minimizing the impact on the wilderness features of the land;
that is, how can the value of the joint products be maximized?
With fee simple title to the land, the wilderness group is forced by
its own criteria to consider the opportunity costs of total nondevelop-
ment. Rather than blindly opposing the extraction of commercially
valuable resources from the land, they must focus on obtaining these
resources while maintaining to an optimal degree the wilderness char-
acter of the area. Different incentives lead to different behavior.
This change is the rules of the federal mineral game could yield
enormous benefits. With land in private hands, all interested parties
would become more constructive in their thinking and in their lan-
guage. Instead of discrediting the goals of others, they would be con-
cerned with how desired ends could be best achieved at the least cost to
others. The owners think this way in order to capture more revenues,
selling off the highest valued package of rights that is consistent with
their own goods. Similarly, a buyer of mining rights or of conservation
easements wants to purchase his valued package at the least cost to the
seller and thus to himself. In addition, the unlimited wants of every
party are forced into priority classes. The most important land rights
will be purchased and declarations that every contested acre is priceless
become suitably absurd.
Even people in single-minded pursuit of profits or of narrow wil-
derness goals will act as # other social goals mattered. Indeed, they
1982]
118 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
may seek out higher valued uses of their own acreage, using profits to
obtain new means to satisfy their own narrow goals. After all, it is their
actions, not the worthiness of their goals, that should concern the rest of
society.
